This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining the standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The central investigation of this paper is whether the application of standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is evidence of constitutional convergence or of borrowing? This paper argues that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on standing indicates that constitutional convergence has never taken place but rather the Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing. Legal borrowing on standing is limited to the carbon copy of the ve prong standing tests of the U.S. model, but in reality standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not based on the private rights model of adjudication. Although the Court allows individuals to bring cases before the Court, it is rather a uasi public model of standing, in which claimants no longer have standing only to vindicate their own private rights but can also sue to vindicate public interests. Standing requirements also allow the judges to review many highly sensitive political cases, and to some extent it enables the Court to second guess the decisions of the di erent branches of government.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining the standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. In a nutshell, the theory of constitutional convergence claims that the content of constitutional law is becoming increasingly similar across the globe. But, having realized the complexities of constitutional convergence, a few caveats and clari cations are in order. First, this article focuses on rights based convergence instead of structural based convergence. David Law, with his theory of a global race to the top, focuses on constitutional convergence in terms of the protection of individual rights.
1 Rights based convergence must be distinguished from structural constitutional convergence, which focuses on the structural form of government, such as separation of powers and democratic elections for the legislature and the head of executive. Mark Tushnet suggests convergence among national constitutional systems can take place in their protection of fundamental rights and their structures, such as the creation of an independent court. 2 As important as the constitutional structure is, this paper will not focus on whether structural convergence occurs in Indonesia, but rather on rights based convergence.
Second, much of the scholarship on rights based convergence focuses on the adoption of rights in the written constitution. Elkins, Ginsburg and Simmons posit that there has been substantial convergence with regard to human rights in national constitutions across the globe. 3 Their studies focus on the incorporation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its complementary treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in various national constitutions. 4 David Law and Mila Versteeg collected data on rights provision from 1 di erent constitutions that were adopted from 194 to 200 , and they conclude that national constitutions, on average, grow similar over time with the inclusion of a relatively high number of rights in the rst place.
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It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the content of the Indonesian David Law, , 99 Calif. L. Rev. 2011 , p. 1163 Constitution and see whether it is characterized by imitation or convergence of rights. The object of investigation of this article is on judicial opinions instead of written constitutions. Thus, in order to analyze rights based convergence in Indonesia, I will consult the Constitutional Court cases of the last decade.
Third, some scholars posit the judges as driving forces behind constitutional convergence. Anne Marie Slaughter postulates the concept of a "global community of judges," arguing that high court judges frequently talk across jurisdiction.
The global community of judges then tries to in uence domestic courts to take particular approaches. 7 Mark Tushnet also argues for judge led convergence, noting the spread of proportionality review, judicial balancing and the language of margins of appreciation as examples of judge led convergence towards adopting common constitutional formula. enactment of the challenged statute and the injury; and 5) there should be the possibility that with the issuance of a favorable decision, the constitutional injury would not occur or would not be repeated.
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Although these requirements are relatively similar to the ve prong standing test in the U.S. Constitutional system, the Indonesian Constitutional Court, has provided a completely di erent interpretation on standing requirements. In the Biem Benjamin case, the Court held, "although the claimant could not show injury in fact (because he never ran for the position of Governor), it can be predicted that the claimant's candidacy would be turned down by the General Election Commission, and therefore the claimant has ful lled the standing requirement." In other words, the Court held that potential injury is su cient to establish standing before the Court.
Although the Biem Benjamin case signi es that the standing requirements arise from individual claims of private rights, it opens the way for constitutional claims invoked by third parties or large groups of people. In the U.S. constitutional realm, this type of standing is known as generalized grievance. 20 The U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted a principle preventing individuals from suing if their only injury is as taxpayer 21 or citizen 22 concerned with having the government follow the Constitution. Unlike the U.S Supreme Court, the Indonesian Constitutional
Court allows individuals to have standing as taxpayer or citizen.
Most of the Indonesian Constitutional Court decisions related to social economic issues were framed within the context of generalized grievance standing.
The rst Court decision that established generalized grievance standing was the Electricity Law case, which dealt with the privatization of the electricity industry. 23 The claimants were human rights NGOs who argued that as non pro t organizations, they had standing to represent the public. 24 The Court The Court ruled that the GNPK had standing because its members were taxpayers whose interest had been harmed by the government's decision to appoint deputy ministers.
Standing and Abstract Review
While it is easy to conclude that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has invented its own standing doctrine, I would like also to consider a structural design that facilitated the rise of generalized grievance standing. By design, the Indonesian Constitutional Court only has authority to pronounce consistency of statute. In other words, the Court only has authority to review a constitutional The Jakarta Post (Jakarta), September 22, 2010.
Standing and Private Rights
Before I move to evaluate whether the Court's standing doctrine is evidence of constitutional convergence or just of constitutional borrowing, it is necessary to explain the standing doctrine within the context of liberal constitution. In this article, I will use the standing doctrine in the U.S. constitutional system as the point of comparison. Although, the Indonesian Constitution has little resemblance to the U.S. Constitution, the ve prong standing test in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is reminiscent of the ve prong test in the U.S. constitutional system. For that reason, it is important to brie y review the standing doctrine as it is found in the U.S. constitutional system. During the mid twentieth century, however, the Court expanded standing by abandoning the private rights requirement. One option for the Court to expand standing was to adopt a public rights model, permitting a private individual to bring suits against any violation of the public interest. Thus, the Court created a quasi public model of standing, in which litigants no longer had standing only to vindicate their own private rights but also to vindicate public interests. The only requirement for standing was that the challenged actions a ect the litigant.
57 See Antonin Scalia, But the litigants were not required to demonstrate the violation of private rights in order to prevail on the merits.
In the last forty years-starting with the Burger Court-the Court has again restricted standing. The belief that liberal access to the courts by private litigants seeking to enforce public rights endangers the separation of powers has driven the Court again to revert to what is essentially a private rights model for standing. But in returning to the private rights model, the Court did not abandon the injury in fact test; instead the Court stated that injury must be "actual", "distinct," "palpable," and "concrete." Abstract injuries such as the injury caused by the government's failure to obey the law were insu cient. In general, the Court has denied standing to taxpayers and held that generalized grievance regarding government misconduct could not support standing, stating that standing required the plainti to allege that he was in danger of su ering any particular concrete injury as a result of the government misconduct.
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Evaluating Standing
Having explained the development of standing doctrine in the United States, this paper will move to evaluate the evolution of standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. First and foremost, this paper argues that the standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is the product of constitutional borrowing rather than constitutional convergence; i.e., when the Court crafted the ve prong standing test in the Biem Benjamin case, some
Justices consciously copied what they saw in the United States.
One plausible driving force behind the borrowing of the U.S. standing doctrine is former associate Justice Achmad Natabaya, who is the proponent of strict standing doctrine. While he was in the Court, Justice Achmad Natabaya preferred the Court to have a limited role and limited access for citizens. Justice Natabaya believed that the Constitutional Court had a limited role in reviewing statutes.
Based on his view of the limited role of the Court, Natabaya believed that the Court should apply a strict standing rule because only through strict would the 61 In the , however, the Court held as a state, Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA over potential damage caused to its territory by global warming.
Court avoid trespassing on the jurisdictions of the other governmental branches.
Natabaya believed that standing rules should require the claimant to assert a personalized and factual injury.
2 According to Natabaya, there was a fundamental aw within the standing mechanism in the Indonesian Constitutional Court because it allowed individual citizens to challenge a statute. The BP Migas case is not only an exemplar of the public rights model of litigation but also evidence that the public rights model of litigation in Indonesia is not remedial because it does not aim to address private wrongs and any remedy provided by the Court will not give you back that to which you were entitled.
In the BP Migas case, the Court held that the establishment of the Regulatory 
